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LEGISLATION-LABOR LAW-MINNESOTA LABOR RELATIONS
ACTS" PASSED IN 1943.-It is common knowledge that the most
influential group in the last session of the Minnesota legislature
was the "farm bloc" and that it was strongly opposed to labor
union activities. The chief basis for this opposition was the fear
that District 50 of the United Mine Workers of America would
seek to compel individual farmers to join that organization by
organizing the employees of the processors of farm products, par-
ticularly the creameries, and then refuse to work on any products
produced by farmers who refused to join the union. The bloc
undertook to eliminate this danger by measures intended to pro-
hibit directly the anticipated conduct, and also to lessen the control
exercised over unions by the officers and other leaders. As is
usually the case with legislation proposed under such a strong
emotional urge, the bills contained a great deal of language appeal-
'This note does not undertake to discuss all labor legislation enacted
at the last session of the Minnesota legislature, but only those relating to con-
troversies with employers. Among the other labor legislation enacted, the
most important were Laws 1943, c. 633, amending the Workmen's Compensa-
tion laws with respect to compensation for occupational diseases, and Laws
1943, c. 650, making numerous amendments to the unemployment compensa-
tion laws. Laws 1943, c. 144, Sec. 6 forbids an employer from selling to his
employees, or otlqers, any merchandise except his own products. TIhe con-
text of this provision indicates that it was the legislative intent to protect
outside merchants against the competition of the employer, who might sell
at wholesale, rather than to protect the employee from coercion to trade at
the company store.
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ing to the emotions but not susceptible of exact meaning, and
would, if enacted, have curbed much activity by labor unions that
is ordinarily regarded today as dearly permissible. At the insistence
of Governor Stassen, there were substituted for these bills, others
of much more limited scope, which were eventually enacted into
two statutes, 2 one of which amended tie existing Minnesota Labor
Relations Act, and the other became a new statute to be known
as the Minnesota Labor Union Democracy Act.
The title to -Minnesota Laws of 1943, c. 624, which amended
the Labor Relations Act, included the clause "prohibiting strikes
by employees against the state or any governmental subdivision
thereof," but the provisions to that effect were omitted from the
enacted statute. The statute did amend the definition of employer ill
the existing statute which expressly excluded therefrom "the
state or any political or governmental subdivision thereof," by
adding thereto "except when used in Mason's Supplement, 1940,
Section 4254-33 as amended."3 The section referred to did not, as
originally enacted or as amended, refer to any employer. It former-
ly made it unlawful for any person to interfere with the free use
of highways, and was amended to provide that any violation by
an employee or labor organization should also be an unfair labor
practice.
The chief purpose of the farm bloc was effectuated by amend-
ments to the Labor. Relations Act which added new definitions of
"agricultural products," "processor," and "marketing organiza-
tion,"' ,' and which made it an unfair labor practice to hinder or
prevent by intimidation or sabotage, or by threats thereof, the
production, transportation, processing or maketing by a processor
or marketing organization, or to combine or conspire to injure
any processor, producer or marketing organization by a boycott to
induce a processor or marketing organization, against his will, to
coerce or inflict damage on a producer; with a proviso guarding
against any iiterpretation of the amendment which would prohibit
a strike by the employees of the processor or marketing organiza-
tion for the bona fide purpose of improving their own working.
conditions or protecting their own rights of organization and col-
2Laws 1943, c. 624, and Laws 1943, c. 625. Laws 1943, c. 658, -also
amended the State Labor Relations Act, Laws 1941, c. 179, Sec. 14, by
reducing to seven days the time during which a temporary restraining order
may remain in effect without a hearing and decision on a motion for a
temporary injunction.
3Laws 1943, c. 624, Sec. 5, amending Laws 1941, 179.14(b).
4Laws 1943, c. 624, Sec. 1, amending Laws 1941, 179.01.
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lective bargaining.5 It is doubtful whether this statute makes any
change in the substantive law as to secondary labor boycotts in
Minnesota,' but the declaration that the conduct amounts to an
unfair labor practice has the effect of freeing suits to enjoin such
activity from the restrictions placed on labor injunctions by the
Minnesota labor disputes injunction act.7
The amendment of 1943 also makes it an unfair labor practice
for any "person or labor organization to co-operate in engaging
in, promoting or inducing a strike" unless the strike has been
approved by a majority vote of the voting employees in a collec-
tive bargaining unit of the employees of an employer or association
of employers against whom the strike is primarily directed.8 This
provision is evidently based on the assumption that in many cases
strikes are called by the unions or their officers against the desires
of the employees. It would be extremely difficult to verify that
assumption, it may be supposed that it is not true in many cases
even where the employer is told by his employees that they are
compelled to strike, for they may be only seeking to preserve his
good will toward them for the period after the strike. Even where
the assumption is true, the requirement of a majority vote at a
time not specified, without any stipulation as to the issues pre-
sented, or provision for impartial supervision of the casting and
counting of the votes, will not prevent strikes in a large number of
the cases. Many unions now require a vote of the unions affected be-
fore a strike can be called, and such vote is frequently taken at the
beginning of negotiations for a new contract so as to strengthen
the bargaining power of the union negotiators. This practice will
undoubtedly continue. In those cases where the union is dominated
by officers who would call a strike in defiance of the wishes of the
members, generally for racketeering purposes, it cannot be ex-
pected that they will not find some means by which they can secure
a favorable strike vote by either coercion or fraud. The administra-
tion of this provision will prove extremely difficult in view of the
5Laws 1943, c. 624, Sec. 2(b), amending Laws 1941, 179.11.
Gin Steffes v. Motion Picture Machine Operators' Union (1917) 136
Minn. 200, 161 N. W 524, the court, in affirming the refusal of an injunction
against picketing plaintiff's theatre, said. "If it (the picketing) be accoin-
panied by acts that constitute obstruction of the street or of access to plain-
tiff's place of business, or if accompanied by any words or acts which con-
stitute intimidation or threats, the whole transaction is unlawful and should
be enjoined." It is probable that the threat of a strike would be held to be
sufficient intimidation. See, also, Chernov, The Labor Injunction in Minne-
sota (1940) 24 Minn. L. Rev. 757, 765.7Laws 1941, 179.14.8Laws 1943, c. 624, Sec. 2(a), amending Laws 1941, 179.11.
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provision of our labor relations act that wherever a craft exists,
that craft shall constitute a separate collective bargaining unit.9 It
will not be safe for any union to call a strike, even if all of the
employees of the plant belong to one union and the strike has been
voted by a large majority, unless it first obtains a determination by
the conciliator of -what separate crafts exist in the plant and counts
separately the votes, of each craft.
The last section of the chapter containing these amendments
enacts a new provision which is not specifically made a part of the
Labor Relations Law.'0 It attempts to provide the forum for
which we have been told jurisdictional disputes are searching.11 It
provides that where such dispute is made the ground for picketing
an employer, or declaring a strike or boycott against him, the
labor conciliator shall certify that fact to the governor, and the
latter shall appoint a labor referee to hear and determine the
dispute, after which the strike, boycott or picketing shall be un-
lawful. The unions involved are expressly given the option of
settling the dispute by reference to a union tribunal, or by arbitra-
tion, but if they fail to do so, and seek to coerce the employer to
settle it for them, thereby generally inflicting an injury which le
has no means of avoiding, the state will intervene and require the
submission of that dispute to an officer appointed by it. In view of
some comments by outside commentators on the fact that Minne-
sota has disregarded the generally accepted principle that the con-
ciliator should not be given the duty to decide controversies, it is
interesting to note that the legislature did not impose the duty
of making these decisions on the conciliator, but created a new
officer to deal with them.
The Labor Union Democracy Act 2 recognizes in its preamble
that most unions are democratically controlled, but the act makes
specific provisions for such control so as to bring all into line. The
principal substantive requirements of the statute are that the offi-
cers of the union shall be elected for terms not exceeding four
years, by a pluraity vote cast at such election unless the union
shall provide for some system for obtaining a majority vote,13 and
that a financial accounting .to- the members Of the union shall be
9Laws 1941, 179.16(2).
"'Laws 1943, c. 624, Sec. 6.
"See Jaffe, Inter-Union Disputes in Search of a Forum (1940) 49 Yale
Law Journ. 424.
2"Laws 1943, c. 625.
13Laws 1943, c. 625, Secs. 2, 3.
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made at least once a year.'4 When it appears to the labor con-
ciliator that a labor organization is not complying with the act,
he shall certify that fact to the governor who may then appoint a
labor referee to hear and determine the issue of non-compliance.
If the referee finds that the union is not complying with the re-
quirements of the act, the labor organization is thereupon dis-
qualified from acting as the bargaining agent for its members until,
after a subsequent hearing, it is found that there is compliance."b
No machinery is provided for obtaining impartial supervision of
the conduct of elections, or a count of the votes, nor for obtaining
an audit of the financial report. It is probable that it will be held
that the referee can find non-compliance with the act if the election
is not fairly held, or if the report is not correct. It is problematical
how effective the sanction of depriving the union of its privilege
of representation under the Labor Relations Act will be. It will
not be able to insist that the employer negotiate with it, nor can
it have the services of the conciliator in obtaining a collective bar-
gaining agreement. A closed shop contract cannot be made with
it while it is disqualified, 6 and perhaps an existing contract will
become invalid. But if the members of the union who are em-
ployees in a particular plant elect to remain loyal to the union
notwithstanding its disqualification, and refuse to work except on
terms agreed to by the union, it appears that the employer will
have no option except to bargain with the union or submit to a
strike. It is probable, however, that the fear of adverse public
opinion will induce every union to make at least a formal com-
pliance with the statute.
So far no issues under any of these statutes have come before
the conciliator,' 7 or have otherwise arisen so far as is known. Their
test will probably come with the termination of the control of the
War Labor Board, and the economic uncertainty that will prevail
at that time.
H. L. M.
14Laws 1943, c. 625, Sec. 4.
15Laws 1943, c. 625, Sec. 5(5).
IGThe Minnesota Labor Relations Act, Laws 1941, 179.12(3), excepts
from the prohibition against coercion of the employees by the employer,
closed shop contracts only if they are entered into voluntarily between the
employer and his employees or a labor organization representing the em-
ployees as a bargaining agent.
17Letter from the Deputy Conciliator, dated November 10, 1943.
